

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN DOGMATISM AND EGO-INVOLVEMENT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Recent research in communication theory has focused on the nature of attitude and attitude change. A thorough understanding of human communication is partly dependent on recognizing the way in which the attitudes held by an audience influence the response to messages.

Approaches to the study of attitudes vary depending on the special interests of the researchers involved. A definition of attitude will serve to illuminate some of the many approaches available. Muzafer Sherif, in the Introduction to Attitude, Ego-Involvement, and Change, states that attitudes speak of events--events in which individuals are influenced by more or less lasting assumptions about their world. According to Sherif,

We are talking about people who have premises and enduring expectations about the way the world operates; about people who hold their family in high esteem; about people who view other groups from different perspectives; about people who value their religion and their country; who have beliefs that strengthen their adherence to a political party; who have convictions about what is right and what is wrong; about people whose sentiments bend them toward this or that person and this or that group, instead of others. When we deal with lasting assumptions, lasting premises, lasting beliefs, lasting convictions, and lasting sentiments we are dealing with attitudes. All these different terms are within the generic domain of attitude study (2, pp. 1-2).

The attitudes held by an individual help to govern a consistent and characteristic way in which that person will react to his social world. His behavior toward persons, groups, institutions and nations will follow the patterns set by his attitudes. Selective perception of his world is the result of a person's attitudes; and these selections, comparisons, choices and decisions imply a judgmental process on the part of the perceiver.

From this definition, two approaches, among many, to attitude study may be derived. First, there is a consistent way in which a man deals with his world and this consistency is due in part to his individual personality structure. Milton Rokeach, in his theory of open- and closed-mindedness (1), centers on this concept of individual personality consistency. Second, the judgments a man makes in a given situation will be influenced by his specific positions on the issues involved. The social judgment-involvement approach of Muzafer Sherif, Carl I. Hovland, Carolyn Sherif, Roger Nebergall, et al. (2, 3, 4), purports to measure this dimension of attitude.

Statement of the Problem and Hypotheses to be Tested

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationships between these personality-centered and issue-centered approaches to a study of attitudes. The relationships will be sought through examination of the essential characteristics

of the ideas behind each approach and by exposing the same population to both of the data-gathering methods employed by these researchers, i.e., Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale, and Sherif, et al.'s Method of Ordered Alternatives. Certain relationships that are assumed to exist form the hypotheses of this study.

Hypothesis I is that there will be a significant relationship between closed-mindedness and high ego-involvement in individuals in this study. In this case, high ego-involvement is operationally defined as the size of the latitude of rejection on the subject's Method of Ordered Alternatives.

Hypothesis II is that there will be a significant difference in the size of the latitude of rejection in a highly ego-involved group when compared with a low ego-involved group. The latitude of rejection in the highly ego-involved group should be larger.

Hypothesis III is that there is a significant difference between the highly ego-involved group and the low ego-involved group with respect to closed-mindedness. It is hypothesized that the highly ego-involved group will possess greater closed-mindedness.

Contents of the Study

Chapter I has presented a definition of attitude in order to demonstrate the wide field of research available to

attitude study. Two approaches to attitude study have been chosen and the purpose of this thesis has been advanced, along with the hypotheses to be tested.

Chapter II examines the backgrounds of each approach being considered, reviews literature pertinent to the study, and explains the instruments which were used to test the hypotheses.

Chapter III concerns the method followed, including explanations of the procedure used, the selection of subjects, and the statistical treatment of the data obtained.

Chapter IV presents the results, statistical tables, and discussion of the results.

Chapter V contains the summary and conclusions with recommendations for further research.

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CHAPTER II

THE OPEN- AND CLOSED-MIND THEORY

The way in which a man deals with his world is dependent on the attitudes he holds. These attitudes create a consistent manner by which all attitudinal judgments are made. In addition, this consistency in behavior is influenced by the unique nature of an individual's personality make-up. Milton Rokeach has investigated the role that personality plays in the formulation of beliefs which form systems that are dominated by the individual's way of thinking. This way of thinking tends to fall into degrees of open-mindedness or closed-mindedness, all of which operate on the attitudinal judgments made by the person. Concerning the formulation of his theory, Rokeach says that

Our research into the nature of belief systems began with the analysis of ideological dogmatism. Over the years, we have had occasion to observe a number of persons, mostly intellectuals, who in real-life settings appeared to be characteristically dogmatic or closed in their modes of thought and belief. . . .

In the initial stage, we also found it helpful to study expressions of institutional dogmatism, as distinguished from individual dogmatism, in the writings of various ideologists and theorists, and in the mass media of communication. Other stimulating ideas came from such books as Orwell's 1984 (1951), Crossman's The God That Failed (1949), Blanshard's Communism, Democracy and Catholic Power (1951), and most of all, Eric Hoffer's The True Believer (1951) (6, p. 4).

As Rokeach investigated his sources, it became clear that there was a ". . . closed way of thinking which could be associated with any ideology regardless of content" (6, p. 4). This way of thinking included ". . . an authoritarian outlook on life, an intolerance toward those with opposing beliefs, and a sufferance of those with similar beliefs" (6, pp. 4-5).

Rokeach's investigations give insight into the general nature of all belief systems, not just the open and closed extremes. A belief system is the structure behind belief. It is not what one believes that counts, but how one believes. In other words, in what manner does one accept and in what manner does one reject. The three distinct types of human acceptance and rejection considered by Rokeach are ideas, people, and authority (6).

Basic to the application of the idea of open- and closed-mindedness is the consistency which seems to mark the individual's way of thinking. Rokeach says, "To say that a person is dogmatic or that his belief system is closed is to say something about the way he believes and the way he thinks-- not only about single issues but also about networks of issues" (6, p. 5). Therefore, in a confrontation with a social issue, the open- or closed-mindedness of the individual will operate on his judgments relevant to that issue.

Rokeach notes certain research which he used in formulating his theory. The work of Fromm (1941) and Maslow (1943)

on the authoritarian character structure was augmented by The Authoritarian Personality by Adorno and others (1950). The F (for fascism) Scale, a measure of authoritarianism, and the Ethnocentrism Scale, both of which appeared in the Adorno study, influenced the Dogmatism Scale and parts of each were incorporated in Rokeach's system.

Plant (5), in a replication study of the Dogmatism Scale as a measure of authoritarianism, upheld Rokeach's contention that the Dogmatism Scale is less loaded with prejudice and is a better measure of authoritarianism than the F Scale. White and Harvey (10) found high correlation between Dogmatism Scale scores and F Scale scores, in varying combinations, ranging from .74 to .91.

Development of the open- and closed-mind theory also incorporated Frenkel-Brunswick's work on the interrelation among personality, belief, and cognition under the general heading of personality-centered approaches to perception (6).

Definitions and Characteristics of the Open and Closed Mind

The degree of open- or closed-mindedness a person has operates on his belief-disbelief systems. "Open" and "closed," instead of being dichotomous, are extremes on a continuum which relates to the individual's belief-disbelief systems. According to Rokeach,

The belief system is conceived to represent all the beliefs, sets, expectancies, or hypotheses, conscious or unconscious, that a person at a given

time accepts as true of the world he lives in. The disbelief system is composed of a series of subsystems rather than merely a single one, and contains all the disbeliefs, sets, expectancies, conscious and unconscious, that, to one degree or another, a person at a given time rejects as false (6, p. 33).


The defining characteristics of what is "open" and what is "closed" are most readily understood when seen in contrast to each other, although a continuum should be visualized.

A belief-disbelief system is open when

1. The magnitude of rejection of disbelief subsystems is relatively low at each point along the continuum.
2. There is communication of parts within and between belief and disbelief systems.
3. There is relatively little discrepancy in the degree of differentiation between belief and disbelief systems.
4. There is relatively high differentiation within the disbelief system.
5. The world one lives in, or the situation one is in at a particular moment, is a friendly one.
6. Authority is not absolute and people are not to be evaluated (if they are to be evaluated at all) according to their agreement or disagreement with such authority.
7. The structure of beliefs and disbeliefs perceived to emanate from authority is such that its substructures are in relative communication with each other.
8. One has a relatively broad time perspective (6, pp. 55-56).

A belief-disbelief system is closed when

1. The magnitude of rejection of disbelief subsystems is relatively high at each point along the disbelief continuum.

2. There is isolation of parts within and between belief and disbelief systems. 

3. There is relatively great discrepancy in the degree of differentiation between belief and disbelief systems.

4. There is relatively little differentiation within the disbelief system.

5. The world one lives in, or the situation one is in at a particular moment, is a threatening one.

6. Authority is absolute and people are to be accepted and rejected according to their agreement or disagreement with such authority.

7. The structure of beliefs and disbeliefs perceived to emanate from authority is such that its substructures are in relative isolation with each other.

8. One has a relatively narrow, future-oriented time perspective (6, pp. 55-56).

These eight principle definitions generate a number of specific implications for the communication process. In general, the more open one's belief system, the more information can be evaluated for its own merits. The individual can act more freely upon information. The more open the person's belief system, the more strength he should have to

resist externally imposed reinforcements, or rewards and punishments (6, p. 58).

Further implications, specifically concerning attitude change which might be caused by belief-discrepant information, were examined by Hunt and Miller (3). They found that open-minded persons, determined by a median split of Dogmatism scores, were more able to tolerate inconsistency, in the form of statements discrepant with their own favorable stand on disarmament, than closed-minded persons. This tolerance was accounted for by the extensive prior exposure to communication inconsistent with their belief systems.

The more closed systems or minds tend to have difficulty distinguishing between information received about the world and information received about the source. Therefore, what is said by a highly accepted source is not questioned, even if the communication is unreasonable. This unquestioning acceptance is more simply stated that the basic defining characteristic of open-closedness is "... the extent to which there is reliance on absolute authority" (6, p. 60). From this definition it follows that communication is sought from and accepted from one's own in-group(s) if one tends toward closed-mindedness.

McCarthy and Johnson (4) asked subjects to give their attitudes on riots that had occurred at their city hall and also to take the Dogmatism scale. Subjects with low scores tended to accept the account of the riots given by the

students involved, while subjects with high scores more often accepted the police version of the events leading to the incident. In this case, the police fit the description of absolute authority.

In their study of the in-group behavior of dogmatic persons, Zagona and Zurcher (11) reported that group behavior was predictable under varying social conditions according to subject's Dogmatism scores. Groups, tested for the characteristics described by Rokeach, generally behaved as would be expected.

The Measurement of Open and Closed Systems: Development of the Dogmatism Scale

The Dogmatism Scale went through five editions, each trying to achieve greater reliability. Also, each new revision reflected modifications, elaborations, and refinements that took place in the development of the theory of open- and closed-mindedness. Form E, the last edition, with forty items, was used in this study.

In terms of reliability, there are eleven tests cited in The Open and Closed Mind (6), using the forty-item Form E. Ranges for these eleven tests are from .68 to .93 reliability. Rokeach says, "These reliabilities are considered to be quite satisfactory, especially when we remember that the Dogmatism Scale contains quite a strange collection of items that cover a lot of territory and appear on the surface to be unrelated to each other" (6, p. 90).

In a reliability study by Zagona and Zurcher (11), test and re-test results provided correlation coefficients ranging from .506 for High Dogmatics, .464 for Low Dogmatics, .186 for Middle Dogmatics (due to the restricted variability of the scores), to an overall sample ($n = 517$) correlation of .697. Rokeach's median correlation score was .74 on the eleven tests previously mentioned (6).

Each of the forty test items is concerned with a particular part of the open-closed mind theory. By referring to Appendix I, the statements which fit each idea of the theory may be noted. They run thusly:

1. Accentuation of differences between the belief and the disbelief systems.

- 2,3. The coexistence of contradictions within the belief system.

4. Relative amount of knowledge possessed.

- 5-8. Beliefs regarding the aloneness, isolation, and helplessness of man.

- 9-13. Beliefs regarding the uncertainty of the future.

14. Beliefs about self-adequacy and inadequacy--specifically the need for martyrdom.

- 15-17. Self-aggrandizement as a defense against self-inadequacy.

- 18-26. Authoritarianism--especially beliefs in positive and negative authority and belief in the cause.

27-33. Intolerance--toward the renegade and toward the disbeliever.

34,35. Tendency to make a party-line change.

36. Narrowing--or the selective avoidance of contact with facts, events, etc., incongruent with one's belief-disbelief system.

37. Attitude toward the past, present, and future.

38-40. Knowing the future (6, pp. 73-80).

Appendix I constitutes the Dogmatism Scale as it was presented for the purposes of this study. The instructions are those suggested by Rokeach, which are the same instructions used in the F Scale (6, p. 72).

The -3 to +3 arrangement for responding excludes the zero point to force responses toward agreement or disagreement. This scale is converted for scoring purposes to a 1-to-7 scale by adding a constant of four to each item score. The total score is the sum of scores obtained on all items in the test. Therefore, a forty score would be the lowest possible and would indicate extreme open-mindedness. Extreme closed-mindedness would score 280 points with the theoretical equilibrium or neutral point being 140.

Mean scores obtained on test samples have ranged from 183.2 to 141.3 in Rokeach's tests mentioned previously (6). Means for tests given by Zagona and Zurcher (11) ranged from 174.6 for High Dogmatics to 130.9 for Low Dogmatics to 152.7 for the entire sample.

The Social Judgment-Involvement Approach

The collaboration of Muzafer Sherif and Carl I. Hovland in 1948 began a research approach to attitude and attitude change based initially on laboratory studies of judgment. Early work centered around psychophysical studies involving judgment of concrete stimuli such as weights. These findings, using motivationally neutral stimuli, were gradually applied to abstract stimuli, such as statements on social issues. The survey of findings on judgment was presented by Sherif and Hovland in Social Judgment in 1961 and amplified by Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall in Attitude and Attitude Change in 1965.

The following concepts, which evolved out of psychophysical studies, are also relevant to psychosocial judgment:

- (1) An individual confronted with a series of stimuli tends to form a psychological scale for judgment;
- (2) There is a close correspondence between the ambiguity or explicitness of a judgment about the series;
- (3) When objective standards and a graded series of stimuli are lacking, internal factors, including set, and social influences, including instructions, increase to help form a judgment scale;
- (4) When no standard is available for judging a stimulus series, the extremes are sought as reference points; and
- (5) Internal anchors are most used when a stimulus is ambiguous and least necessary when well-structured stimulus materials are judged (9).

The most lasting internal anchors are those formed during life experiences of the individual. These anchors include the person's established attitudes toward the stimulus material, whether in experimental or real-life situations, and the degree of ego-involvement with the stimulus.

The greater the degree of ego-involvement in a stimulus, the more likely that any judgment of the stimulus will arouse the person's attitudes toward it. Also, if the stimulus material is to be ordered in any manner by the individual whose ego-involvement with the stimuli is high, certain predictable placement errors will occur due to previously established acceptances and rejections of stimulus items (9, p. 185).

Placement errors are relative to one's own stand, which serves as an ego-involved internal anchor in the social judgment process. For almost all social issues, the extreme positions appear to be more clearly stated and more easily recognized than positions located between the extremes. One's own stand on an issue, serving as an anchor, tends to create marked displacement of the not-so-clear intermediate items through assimilation or contrast phenomena.

Since one's own position becomes an anchor in a situation calling for judgment of a social issue, a communication representing a stand that corresponds closely to one's own anchor position will be judged correctly. But if the communication happens to be only slightly removed from the position,

the individual may then judge the communication to be more like his own position than it really is. This is the assimilation effect. One other outcome of this assimilation is to evaluate the communication as fair and unbiased, similar to the in-group judgments of the closed mind suggested by Rokeach (6).

When there is a great perceived discrepancy between a person's own stand and the position advocated in the communication, the individual will judge the message to be farther away from his own position than it actually is. He will also tend to say that the message is unfair. Again, this action is similar to the judgments expected from the closed mind.

Further connection between Rokeach's theory and the ego-involved assimilation-contrast patterns concerns the source of message. According to Sherif and Hovland,

. . . the internalization of a social anchor depends upon the subject's prior placement of the source. Prior experience may lead the individual to regard the source as lacking in credibility and to reject his suggestion. He is more likely to heed the suggestion of a source he has come to regard as expert, authoritative, or prestigious. In actual social interaction, the source is frequently identified by the subject as a member with given standing in his group or in an out-group. The effectiveness of a suggestion is thus closely related to the individual's motivational ties with his reference groups and the relative standing accorded other individuals and groups in their established scheme of relationship (9, p. 184).

Thus, it is possible that the social judgment an individual makes in a highly ego-involved condition will depend a great deal on those characteristics which mark the closed mind.

Hunt and Miller (3) hypothesized that closed-minded persons would assimilate belief-discrepant communication from highly credible sources more than open-minded persons, and that closed-minded persons would contrast belief-congruent communications from low-credibility sources more than open-minded subjects. While neither hypothesis was upheld, Nebergall (8) advised the experimenters that little assimilation or contrast occurs when discrepancy is great and the communication unambiguous, which occurred in the high credibility:belief-discrepant portions of the study.

In order to assess the structure of an attitude from the Sherif, et al., approach, one must consider not only a person's own preferred position and level of commitment to that position, but also his acceptance-rejection pattern in relation to the statements concerned with the issue involved. That a single position in a series does not adequately represent why a person reacts to relevant communication in a particular way is unique to this approach to attitudes. Hence, a person has not one position on an issue, but a range of acceptable positions which include his own stand and other acceptable positions (the latitude of acceptance), a range of unacceptable positions (the latitude of rejection), and a range of positions about which the individual has no particular feelings (the latitude of noncommitment).

These latitudes have revealed a certain stability through numerous research studies. First, the size of the

latitude of acceptance is a poor indicator of difference among individuals chiefly because it varies little and is quite stable from issue to issue. The location of the acceptance latitude, however, is important to the overall attitude profile (8, pp. 56-57). Second, relative to extremity of stand, the latitude of acceptance is not significant ($p > .05$). However, the latitude of noncommitment and of rejection both show significant correlation to extremity of stand ($p < .001$) (8, p. 47).

Sherif and Hovland (9) inferred that highly ego-involved subjects have a more constricted latitude of acceptance and a more extensive latitude of rejection than less ego-involved subjects. In other words, the degree of ego-involvement is demonstrated by the size of the latitude of rejection. Further evidence reinforces this relationship between latitude of rejection and ego-involvement. Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall (8) suggest that the latitude of rejection is the best single indicator of involvement. On their analysis of certain studies, ". . . the number of positions rejected proved to be the most discriminating index of relative ego-involvement or commitment" (8, p. 156).

One of the characteristics of the research projects using the social judgment approach has been the consistent way in which groups that one would expect, because of their behavior, to be ego-involved have reflected that involvement in relatively large latitudes of rejection. In this sense,

then, the MOA appears to be a sensitive instrument for the detection of levels of involvement among individuals and groups.

Although the exact positions rejected would tend to fall into a particular pattern because of the nature of gradation in the structure of the MOA, their precise location does not seem to be a factor in the determination of ego-involvement. For example, if a person selected "A" or "B" as his most-favored position, one would expect that his rejection range would include the statements on the other end of the continuum (F, G, H, and I). On the other hand, if a person elected "E" (neutrality) as his most-favored position, his rejection range would most likely include the positions on both ends of the continuum (A, B, H, and I). Whereas there appears to be a statistical relationship between extremity and intensity, this is not to say necessarily that a person who selects "A" or "B" as the most favored position is more involved than a person who selects "C" or "D." Furthermore, even though two people may select the same preferred positions, they may differ radically in the relative sizes of their latitudes of rejection and, consequently, represent different levels of intensity.

An example of results from a study utilizing the Method of Ordered Alternatives will demonstrate the interaction of the three latitudes obtained on the test and also show stability by point spread. Point spread of the latitude of

acceptance is .6; of the latitude of rejection, 1.9; and of the latitude of noncommitment, 1.3. As the following table indicates, as the latitude profiles move from the "E" or middle position to both extremes, the latitude of acceptance tends to remain fairly constant while the latitude of rejection increases and the latitude of noncommitment decreases. This phenomena has been observed in all studies utilizing the MOA. This table (8, p. 53) presents the mean sizes of latitudes obtained concerning the Presidential elections in Oklahoma in 1960.

TABLE I
SAMPLE VARIATIONS IN SIZES OF LATITUDES OBTAINED
FROM METHOD OF ORDERED ALTERNATIVES

Latitude of	Stand Chosen								
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
Acceptance	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.1	2.5	2.6	3.1	3.0	2.9
Rejection	4.9	4.3	3.7	3.6	3.0	3.4	3.2	4.0	4.9
Noncommitment	1.3	1.7	2.2	2.3	3.5	3.0	2.7	2.0	1.2

Development of the Method of Ordered Alternatives:
The Measurement of Attitude on a Social Issue

Although Sherif and Hovland (9) and Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall (8) do not title their data-gathering device, Sherif, in Attitude, Ego-Involvement, and Change, refers to the nine-position technique as the Method of Ordered

Alternatives (7, p. 116). For the purposes of this study, the name will be shortened to MOA.

Creation of an MOA first requires that a survey of existing stands on an issue be used to obtain nine statements ranging from one extreme to another to be ordered by individuals into their latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment. The form used in the MOA technique has been consistent since its initial use by Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif (1).

The positions are scaled from strongly pro (A) to strongly con (I), with E being a neutral statement. A subject is instructed to indicate his most acceptable position and all others acceptable and his most unacceptable position and all others unacceptable. The latitude of acceptance is the sum of the acceptable positions with one's own stand being indicated by the position marked as most acceptable. The latitude of rejection is the sum of the objectionable positions. All unmarked positions become the latitude of noncommitment (7, 8, 9).

MOA Construction for This Study

An instrument composed and tested in a pilot study by Sherif (Appendix II) was used for this research. The nine statements concern riots in American cities, overlaid with racial implications. The social issue involved was keyed to the partisan, High Ego-Involved group tested (Group I) since

ego-involvement was the variable to be watched as indicated by the latitude of rejection.

This particular set of nine statements was used by Sherif in his 1968 attitude study of the presidential campaign and was utilized in its exact form in this research project. The construction of this instrument follows the procedures which are mentioned previously in this study. In order to learn more about this particular approach and technique, one should consult the work of Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall (8).

Relationships Between Open- and Closed-Mindedness and Social Judgment

In this chapter, the relationships between the ideas behind two approaches to attitudes have been examined by reviewing some essential characteristics of each approach. The data-gathering device used by each system was explained and its use in this study was described. Further similarities between Rokeach's theory and Sherif, et al., approach are articulated by the authors involved.

Rokeach says,

We feel quite satisfied in concluding from . . . evidence . . . that to a large extent the shape of a person's belief-disbelief system is relatively enduring, "carried around" within his personality from one situation to another and accounting for many of the uniformities we can observe in his actions. But this does not mean that the situation itself cannot influence a person's behavior. Nor does it mean that a person's belief system is open or closed to the same degree at different times. We think of a person's belief system as possessing not only enduring properties, but also the property of expanding and contracting, of becoming more

open, or more closed, in response to a specific situation in which the person finds himself (6, pp. 376-377).

To further demonstrate the feasibility of using the Dogmatism Scale and the MOA together, Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall note

Individual differences are to be found in latitudes of acceptance and rejection, as in any psychological phenomenon. But the regularities in their patterning according to the location of the bounds of acceptability, and the degree of the individual's involvement in his stand permit more accurate prediction of his reaction to communication and his susceptibility or resistance to attitude change, than qualities of the person in the abstract, such as rigidity or flexibility assessed without regard to task or content. For future exploration of personal flexibility and rigidity, we propose that the person's latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment be studied on a variety of issues of differing personal import to him.

Our hypothesis is that every individual possesses content areas or clusters in which he is open minded and others in which he is more closed. We would expect that these clusters are related to degree of personal involvement in the content areas. Thus, we predict that for matters high in the individual's scheme of ego-involved priorities, his latitude of rejection would be greater and latitude of non-commitment smaller than for matters lower in the hierarchy of ego values. . . . To a considerable extent, those high in the hierarchy should be predictable from the values of his reference groups (8, p. 235).

If the fluctuations predicted for Rokeach's theory and for Sherif, Sherif, Hovland, and Nebergall's approach are valid, then simultaneous use of the Dogmatism Scale and the Method of Ordered Alternatives should indeed produce more meaningful results to future researchers in attitudes.

Because of the varied uses to which each test has been put, the significant correlation between the data produced by each instrument should provide groundwork for further use of the tests.

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CHAPTER III

METHOD

Procedure

In order to test the hypotheses mentioned in the first chapter, three groups were administered both the Dogmatism Scale and the specially constructed MOA. Two of the groups, defined as partisans in relation to the make-up of the MOA, were combined for statistical purposes. All tests were conducted at a large state university in the southwest.

The first group, which was defined as partisan and highly ego-involved, consisted of nineteen members of a newly organized Negro male fraternity. As was the established procedure in the study, the MOA was administered first, followed by the Dogmatism Scale.

The second group, also defined as partisan and highly ego-involved, consisted of fifteen members of a newly formed Negro female sorority. As with all three groups, the females were asked to follow the instructions presented on the instruments, as shown in Appendices I and II. Time was granted from the weekly meeting of the fraternity and the sorority for test completion, after which each club resumed its scheduled activities.

The third group consisted of ninety-two students, male and female, meeting for a required government course. The

tests were handed to each subject as he entered the lecture hall. A normal class meeting followed the completion of the tests.

Selection of Subjects

For the purposes of using a suitable MOA properly keyed to a partisan, highly ego-involved population, the two newly organized, university-recognized Negro student groups were chosen. The working of the MOA was concerned with current racial problems in the United States and was, therefore, ideally suited to Negro subjects. Sherif and Sherif (1964) relate that intensive studies of natural groups have shown that a person's ego-involvements

. . . are related to his group membership and that the latitudes of acceptance and rejection differ both for members of different groups and for members of the same group according to their roles and the importance of an issue to that group (1, p. 135).

The Negro groups, which were reference groups for members of a racial minority--the same racial minority with which the MOA was concerned--produced the predictions of larger latitudes of rejection and higher dogmatism scores than Group 2.

Conversely, the government lecture class was a togetherness group, brought together by academic requirement with no particular connection among the individuals to a race issue. For this reason, the class, or Group 2, was assumed to be much less ego-involved in the contents of the MOA statements than the Negro groups. Group 2 was therefore predicted to

evidence lower dogmatism scores and smaller latitudes of rejection than Group 1.

Statistical Treatment

Means and standard deviations were computed for both variables for the two groups. Hypothesis I was tested by computing a product-moment correlation coefficient between variables 1 (Dogmatism score) and 2 (latitude of rejection). The significance of the r from zero was determined by a t -test for correlation coefficients. The difference between means for the two groups (Hypotheses II and III) was determined by a t -test for independent groups.

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CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

The present research was designed to study the relationships between Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale and Sherif, et al.'s, Method of Ordered Alternatives when used with subjects deemed to be highly ego-involved in or generally neutral about a social issue. Specifically, the following hypotheses were advanced: (1) That there will be a significant relationship between closed-mindedness and high ego-involvement in individuals in this study; (2) That there will be a significant difference in the size of the latitude of rejection in a highly ego-involved group when compared with a low ego-involved group. The latitude of rejection in the highly ego-involved group should be larger; and (3) That there is a significant difference between the highly ego-involved group and the low ego-involved group with respect to closed-mindedness. The highly ego-involved group should possess greater closed-mindedness.

Relative to Hypothesis I, the mean for Variable 1 (Dogmatism score) was 151.4 (S.D. = 27.4), $N = 126$. Mean for Variable 2 (latitude of rejection) was 3.03 (S.D. = 1.1), $N = 126$. Thus, the correlation coefficient was .1848, $t = 2.04$ ($p = .05$). Therefore, Hypothesis I is accepted. Data for the hypothesis are presented in Table II.

TABLE II
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR HYPOTHESIS I

Groups I and II (N = 126)					
Variable	Means	S.D.	<u>r</u>	<u>t</u>	P
Dogmatism (1)	151.4	27.4	.1848	2.04	.05
Lat. of Rej. (2)	3.3	1.1			

Concerning Hypothesis II, the mean for Variable 2 in Group 1 was 3.74 (S.D. = 1.2) and mean for Variable 2 in Group 2 was 2.77 (S.D. = .93). Fisher t was 4.71, significant at .001 level. Therefore, Hypothesis II is accepted.

For Hypothesis III, the mean for Variable 1 in Group 1 was 158.8 (S.D. = 28.2) and the mean for Variable 1 in Group 2 was 148.7 (S.D. = 26.6). Fisher t was 1.86 ($p = .1$), not significant at the .05 level, causing rejection of the third hypothesis. It may be noted that when statistical significance is marginal, as in the proof for Hypothesis I, further related statistical treatments, such as those used for Hypothesis III, may prove to be marginally not significant. Therefore, arbitrary acceptance and rejection of hypotheses is subject to the need for further substantiation. Data for Hypotheses II and III are presented in Table III.

The rejection of Hypothesis III should be more closely scrutinized, and to this end Variables 1 and 2 were

TABLE III
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR HYPOTHESES II & III

Variable	Group I (N = 34)		Group II (N = 92)			
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	<u>t</u>	P
1	158.8	28.2	148.7	26.6	1.86	NS
2	3.74	1.2	2.77	.93	4.71	.001

correlated within Group I, with male scores separated from the female scores. For the males, Variable 1 mean was 164.8 (S.D. = 30.03), while female Variable 1 mean was 151.3 (S.D. = 23.7). Fisher t was 1.4, significant at .2 level. Further, the correlation coefficient of Variables 1 and 2 for the males was .349, yielding t = 1.6, $p = .2$, and for the females was -.31, yielding t = -1.2, $p = .3$. While no significance was found concerning Hypothesis III, the negative correlation of the female subjects holds implications for the Dogmatism Scale.

Vacchiano, Schiffman, and Strauss (1) found that factor analysis of items in the Dogmatism Scale revealed different factor formations for males, as opposed to females, and indicated that the scale was not measuring the same dimensions of dogmatism for the two sexes. Possible explanation was offered that females are afforded different cultural outlets for dogmatism than males.

As predictable from definition, the two sexes did not differ significantly in their latitudes of rejection. Data regarding this analysis are presented in Table IV.

TABLE IV
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF MALES AND FEMALES
WITHIN GROUP I

Variable	Males (N = 19)		Females (N = 15)		<u>t</u>	P
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.		
1	164.8	30.03	151.3	23.7	1.4	NS
2	4.05	1.1	3.33	1.1	1.8	NS

Although Group II of this study was not differentiated as to sex, further investigation with the variable of sex differences between groups seems to be feasible and necessary.

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CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has examined the relationships between Rokeach's personality-centered theory of open- and closed-mindedness and Sherif, et al.'s issue-centered approach to social judgment. Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale and Sherif, et al.'s Method of Ordered Alternatives were administered together to groups judged to be highly ego-involved and low ego-involved in the MOA social issue, that of riots in American cities.

Three hypotheses formed the bases for stating relationships between the ideas of Rokeach and Sherif. The first hypothesis was that there would be a significant relationship between closed-mindedness and high ego-involvement in individuals in this study, and this was upheld, significant at the .05 level. The second hypothesis, that there would be a significant difference in the size of the latitude of rejection in the highly ego-involved group when compared with low ego-involved group, was accepted, significance being $<.001$. Hypothesis III, that there would be significantly greater closed-mindedness in the highly ego-involved group than in the low ego-involved group, was not upheld statistically and implications for the Dogmatism Scale were discussed.

The results of this study add to the body of knowledge available to those interested in attitude and attitude change and its implications for communication theory. The more an individual knows about both the nature of attitude rigidity and the kinds of people who hold such intense attitudes, the more adept he should be in designing persuasive messages. This study has attempted to explore even further the characteristics of ego-involvement and, hopefully, will make a contribution toward a better understanding of human behavior.

Suggestions for Future Research

The findings of this study were limited by the inclusion of only two variables, Dogmatism score and latitude of rejection. Future research should follow these several ideas: (1) Replication, for further substantiation of these findings; (2) Studies in which all three latitudes obtained on the MOA should be analyzed for their relationship to Dogmatism scores; (3) Consideration of own positions on the MOA and their relation to Dogmatism scores in order to assist in future understanding of the fluctuation mentioned by the several authors; (4) More connection of sex differences to each test, which may account for phenomena witnessed in this study; (5) Measurement of the responses that groups would make to various communicated messages and the relationships between those responses and involvement and dogmatism levels.

APPENDIX I

The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels about a number of important social and personal questions. The best answer to each statement below is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many people feel the same as you do.

Mark each statement in the left margin according to how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one.

Write +1, +2, +3, or -1, -2, -3, depending on how you feel in each case.

+1: I AGREE A LITTLE

-1: I DISAGREE A LITTLE

+2: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE

-2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE

+3: I AGREE VERY MUCH

-3: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

- _____ 1. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.
- _____ 2. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.
- _____ 3. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.
- _____ 4. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.
- _____ 5. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.
- _____ 6. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.
- _____ 7. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.
- _____ 8. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.

- ____ 9. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.
- ____ 10. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.
- ____ 11. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion, I just can't stop.
- ____ 12. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.
- ____ 13. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.
- ____ 14. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.
- ____ 15. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.
- ____ 16. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.
- ____ 17. If given the chance I would do something of great benefit to the world.
- ____ 18. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful of really great thinkers.
- ____ 19. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for.
- ____ 20. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived.
- ____ 21. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.
- ____ 22. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world, there is probably only one which is correct.
- ____ 23. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.

- ____ 24. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.
- ____ 25. When it comes to differences of opinion in religion, we must be careful not to compromise with those who believe differently from the way we do.
- ____ 26. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness.
- ____ 27. The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the people who believe in the same thing he does.
- ____ 28. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against ideas put out by people or groups in one's own camp than by those in the opposing camp.
- ____ 29. A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long.
- ____ 30. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.
- ____ 31. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.
- ____ 32. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.
- ____ 33. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.
- ____ 34. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.
- ____ 35. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.
- ____ 36. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.
- ____ 37. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts.

- ____ 38. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life, it is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all."
- ____ 39. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don't really understand what's going on.
- ____ 40. Most people just don't know what's good for them.

APPENDIX II

The statements below represent different positions concerning the initiators and participants in the riots that have swept many American cities, especially in recent summers.

Please read all of the statements carefully first before making any marks on this page.

Now that you have read all of the statements carefully, draw a line under the one statement that comes closest to your point of view on this matter. Underline only one statement on this page.

-
- A. In every case, the riots in American cities are initiated by small groups of irresponsible and unbalanced troublemakers.
 - B. It is safe to assume that small groups of unbalanced troublemakers incite most of the riots in American cities.
 - C. In assigning responsibility for the riots, one should look into the role that small groups of unbalanced troublemakers play in them.
 - D. Although it is difficult to be sure, it is probable that responsibility in at least some riots lies with a handful of troublemakers.
 - E. It is difficult to decide whether the riots are initiated by small groups of unbalanced troublemakers or whether riots are natural flareups on the part of frustrated and oppressed people.
 - F. Although it is hard to be sure, the reactions of oppressed people probably lie at the roots of at least some of the riots.
 - G. In assigning responsibility for the riots, one should look into the role played by frustration caused by white discrimination.
 - H. It is safe to assume that frustration suffered by oppressed people is at the roots of most riots in American cities.
 - I. All of the riots in American cities are spontaneous and natural reactions of oppressed people who have been denied their human rights.

The statements below are the same statements as on the last page.

Please read all statements once more before making any marks on the page.

There may be another statement or other statements which are also acceptable from your point of view. If there are, put a circle around the letter in front of such a statement or statements which are also acceptable.

-
- A. In every case, the riots in American cities are initiated by small groups of irresponsible and unbalanced troublemakers.
 - B. It is safe to assume that small groups of unbalanced troublemakers incite most of the riots in American cities.
 - C. In assigning responsibility for the riots, one should look into the role that small groups of unbalanced troublemakers play in them.
 - D. Although it is difficult to be sure, it is probable that responsibility in at least some riots lies with a handful of troublemakers.
 - E. It is difficult to decide whether the riots are initiated by small groups of unbalanced troublemakers or whether riots are natural flareups on the part of frustrated and oppressed people.
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 - H. It is safe to assume that frustration suffered by oppressed people is at the roots of most riots in American cities.
 - I. All of the riots in American cities are spontaneous and natural reactions of oppressed people who have been denied their human rights.

The statements below are the same as those on the two preceding pages.

Please read the statements again and select the one statement which is most objectionable from your point of view. Cross out that one statement which is most objectionable--draw lines through the statement to cross it out.

-
- A. In every case, the riots in American cities are initiated by small groups of irresponsible and unbalanced troublemakers.
 - B. It is safe to assume that small groups of unbalanced troublemakers incite most of the riots in American cities.
 - C. In assigning responsibility for the riots, one should look into the role that small groups of unbalanced troublemakers play in them.
 - D. Although it is difficult to be sure, it is probable that responsibility in at least some riots lies with a handful of troublemakers.
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 - H. It is safe to assume that frustration suffered by oppressed people is at the roots of most riots in American cities.
 - I. All of the riots in American cities are spontaneous and natural reactions of oppressed people who have been denied their human rights.

The statements below are the same as those on the three preceding pages.

Please look over the statements again before making any marks on this page.

There may be another statement or other statements which you find objectionable from your point of view. If there are, show which are objectionable by crossing out the letter in front of such a statement or statements.

-
- A. In every case, the riots in American cities are initiated by small groups of irresponsible and unbalanced troublemakers.
 - B. It is safe to assume that small groups of unbalanced troublemakers incite most of the riots in American cities.
 - C. In assigning responsibility for the riots, one should look into the role that small groups of unbalanced troublemakers play in them.
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